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Abstract: Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be inde-
pendent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and
that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up
a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where
morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators,
each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The frame-
work is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we
also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness,
and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
Keywords: consciousness; conscious agents; compositionality; combination problem; mathematics
of conciousness; monoidal categories; panpsychism
1. Introduction
Despite scientific advances in understanding the objective neural correlates of con-
sciousness [1], science has so far failed in recovering subjective features from objective
and measurable correlates of consciousness. One example is the unity of consciousness.
According to the phenomenology of consciousness [2,3], one of the most salient features
of conscious experience is its unity: “any set of conscious states of a subject at a time is
unified...by being aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness” [3]. If someone
experiences colour and noise, the experience of colour is not followed by the experience of
noise separately, even though it might be sequential, but both are experienced together as
different aspects/content of one single conscious experience. Current models postpone
the explanation of that unity, assuming there will be further developments [4]. In the
meantime, they reduce conscious experience to neural events.
In this article, we present an alternative approach: consciousness as a fundamental
process of nature. Our approach takes inspiration from the Yogacara school [5,6], conscious
agents model [7] and phenomenology [8,9]. In our framework, subjectivity, a key feature
of consciousness is characterised as other-dependent, also called co-dependent, i.e., the
nature of existence arising from causes and conditions that are interdependent between
each other. Without falling into idealism or dualism, we propose that consciousness should
be treated as a primary process.
To model the co-dependent nature, we propose a compositional model for consciousness.
This model is based on symmetric monoidal categories (Section 2), a.k.a Process Theory [10,11].
At the core of process theory lies the principle of compositionality (Section 3). Composition-
ality defines the whole as compositions of the parts. These parts, however, are not trivial
decompositions, they contain in themselves the very properties that define the whole (in our
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case, conscious processes compound other conscious processes). Parts and the whole are
therefore defined together, they co-depend. Compositionality is thus a middle ground between
reductionism and holism [12]. This makes process theory and our compositional framework
suitable for investigating the irreducible structural properties of conscious experience [13].
Finally, our framework intends to mathematize a few aspects of the phenomenology
of conscious experience (Section 4) and target its major questions [14,15]. For instance,
the unity of consciousness naturally arises as result of composition, and the combination
of fundamental experiences is discussed in light of our framework (Section 5). This
new perspective of scientific models of consciousness invokes pure mathematical entities,
avoiding any ontological claim of their physical substrates (Section 6).
2. Category Theory and Process Theory
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic notions of Category theory [16,17],
process theory [11] and graphical calculus [18].
2.1. Preliminaries
Category
A category C consists of:
• a class of objects ob(C);
• for each pair of objects A, B, a set C(A, B) of morphisms from A to B;
• for each triple of objects A, B, C, a composition map
C(B, C)× C(A, B) −→ C(A, C)
(g, f ) 7→ g ◦ f ;
• for each object A, an identity morphism 1A ∈ C(A, A),
satisfying the following axioms:
• associativity: for any f ∈ C(A, B), g ∈ C(B, C), h ∈ C(C, D), there holds (h ◦ g) ◦ f =
h ◦ (g ◦ f );
• identity law: for any f ∈ C(A, B), 1B ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1A.
A morphism f ∈ C(A, B) is an isomorphism if there exists a morphism g ∈ C(B, A) such
that g ◦ f = 1A and f ◦ g = 1B. A product category A×B can be defined componentwise by
two categories A and B.
Functor




• for each pair of objects A, B of C, a map
C(A, B) −→ D(F(A), F(B))
f 7→ F( f ),
satisfying the following axioms:
• preserving composition: for any morphisms f ∈ C(A, B), g ∈ C(B, C), there holds
F(g ◦ f ) = F(g) ◦ F( f );
• preserving identity: for any object A of C, F(1A) = 1F(A).
A functor F : C −→ D is faithful (full) if for each pair of objects A, B of C, the map
C(A, B) −→ D(F(A), F(B))
f 7→ F( f )
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is injective (surjective).
A bifunctor (also called binary functor) is just a functor whose domain is the product
of two categories.
Natural Transformation
Let F, G : C −→ D be two functors. A natural transformation τ : F → G is a family









for all morphisms f ∈ C(A, B). A natural isomorphism is a natural transformation where
each of the τA is an isomorphism.
Strict Monoidal Category
A strict monoidal category consists of:
• a category C;
• a unit object I ∈ ob(C);
• a bifunctor −⊗− : C× C −→ C,
satisfying
• associativity: for each triple of objects A, B, C of C, A⊗ (B⊗ C) = (A⊗ B)⊗ C; for
each triple of morphisms f , g, h of C, f ⊗ (g⊗ h) = ( f ⊗ g)⊗ h;
• unit law: for each object A of C, A ⊗ I = A = I ⊗ A; for each morphism f of C,
f ⊗ 1I = f = 1I ⊗ f .
Strict Symmetric Monoidal Category
A strict monoidal category C is symmetric if it is equipped with a natural isomorphism
σA,B : A⊗ B→ B⊗ A
for all objects A, B, C of C satisfying:
σB,A ◦ σA,B = 1A⊗B, σA,I = 1A, (1B ⊗ σA,C) ◦ (σA,B ⊗ 1C) = σA,B⊗C.
Strict Monoidal Functor
Given two strict monoidal categories C and D, a strict monoidal functor F : C −→ D is
a functor F : C −→ D such that F(A)⊗ F(B) = F(A⊗ B), F( f )⊗ F(g) = F( f ⊗ g), F(IC) =
ID, for any objects A, B of C, and any morphisms f ∈ C(A, A1), g ∈ C(B, B1).
A strict symmetric monoidal functor F is a strict monoidal functor that preserves
symmetrical structures, i.e., F(σA,B) = σF(A),F(B). The definition of a general (non-strict)
symmetric monoidal functor can be found in [17].
Strict Compact Closed Category
A strict compact closed category is a strict symmetric monoidal category C such that
for each object A of C, there exists a object A∗ and two morphisms
εA : A⊗ A∗ → I, ηA : I → A∗ ⊗ A
satisfying:
(εA ⊗ 1A) ◦ (1A ⊗ ηA) = 1A, (1∗A ⊗ εA) ◦ (ηA ⊗ 1∗A) = 1∗A.
A strict compact closed category is called self-dual if A = A∗ for each object A [19].
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2.2. Process Theory
Process theory is an abstract framework of how things happen, be they mental or physical
and regardless of their nature. Process theory describes how processes are composed. It has
been widely used in various research fields such as the foundations of physical theories [20],
quantum theory [19,21], causal models [22,23], relativity [24] and interestingly also natural
language [25] and cognition [26,27]. In common with all theories, process theory has its
own assumptions, albeit with the advantage that its major feature is that it contains minimal
assumptions.
In process theory, we first assume an event occurs, i.e., a change from something typed




Second, we assume somethings happen sequentially, such as a process g happens






f happens after g can be seen as a single process from type C to type B, which is
denoted by f ◦ g : C → B. This is called sequential composition. As such, three things
happening in sequence is seen as one process without any ambiguity, i.e., the sequential
composition of processes is associative: ( f ◦ g) ◦ h = f ◦ (g ◦ h). We also assume that for
each type A, there exists a process called the identity 1A, which does nothing at all to A.
This is depicted as a straight line:
A
As a consequence, given a process f : A→ B, we have 1B ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1A .
Third, we assume that there should be different processes happening simultaneously.





If we view two types, say A and C, as a single type which we denote as A⊗ C, then
the simultaneous processes f and g is a single process from type A⊗ C to type B⊗ D, that
we denote as f ⊗ g : A⊗ C → B⊗ D. We call this a parallel composition of processes.
The above depiction of f ⊗ g is asymmetric: f on the left while g on the right. This
is due to the limitation of a planar drawing. If we want two processes that occur simulta-
neously placed in a symmetric way, it would mean that if we swap their positions, they
should be essentially the same where all the types should match. This can be realised by
adding a swap process:
BA
AB

















With these basic assumptions, processes can be organised into what is called a process
theory in the framework of a strict symmetric monoidal category (SMC). A much more
detailed description of process theory can be found in [19].
To relate sequential and paralell composition in a simple way, one can add the compact














Mathematically speaking, we now have a compact closed category.
As introduced above, process theory focuses on the processes instead of the ob-
jects/types, providing a philosophical advantage: process theories emphasise transforma-
tions, avoiding any ontological claim or substance-like description of invariant properties of
those types, like mass and charge.
2.3. Fine-Grained Version of Process Theory
In general process theory, most of the boxes (processes) are unspecified in the sense
that what is inside a box is unknown, whereas we need to know more details about their
interactions in some applications. In other words, we need a fine-grained version of process
theory. The typical way to derive such a version is to generate all the processes by a set of
basic processes called generators, while specifying those generators in terms of equations
of processes composed of generators. Below, we illustrate this idea by a typical example
called ZX-calculus.
ZX-calculus is a process theory invented by Bob Coecke and Ross Duncan as a graphi-
cal language for a pair of complementary quantum processes (represented by two diagrams
called green spider and red spider respectively) [18]. All the processes in ZX-calculus are di-
agrams composed sequentially or in parallel, either of green spiders with phase parameters,
red spiders with phase parameters, straight lines, swaps, caps or cups.
These generators satisfy a set of diagrammatic equations called rewriting rules: one
can rewrite each diagram into an equivalent one by replacing a part of the diagram which
is on one side of an equation with the diagram on the other side of the equation. All the ZX
diagrams modulo (modulo means using an equivalent relation) and the rewriting rules
form a self-dual compact closed category [18]. To guarantee that there are no conflicts
in this rewriting system, ZX-calculus needs a property called soundness: there exists a
standard interpretation from the category of ZX diagrams to the category of matrices, i.e.,
a symmetric monoidal functor between them [18]. More general, a sound rewriting system
means that there are not internal contradictions, while completeness would mean that we
can prove anything that is right about the phenomena in question with the chosen system.
A sound and complete rewriting system defines a unique set of generators.
3. Compositional Approach For Consciousness-Only
In this section, we motivate and explain the concepts of consciousness as fundamental
and also the structure for consciousness given by the Yogacara School.
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3.1. Process Theory for Consciousness
In any attempt to model consciousness, we expect to fulfill at least three theoretical
requirements. First, one would like a theory with a basic and minimum set of assumptions.
Process theory seems to fit with that requirement. Symmetric monoidal categories start
from a minimum and specific intuitive form to deal with compositions, sequential and
parallel. In the rest of this work, we will assume that this minimal structure already convey
part of the experience structure. This assumption is partially justified in the fact that, despite
a unified experience, we only experience things happening in sequence (one after the other,
time) or in parallel (side by side, space).
Second, one would expect those minimum assumptions to be explicit. In other words,
we need to model the nature of consciousness from explicit, primitive and axiomatic
principles. Process theory in particular, and category theory in general, provides us with an
exceptionally well suited mathematics for such axiomatic purposes. Due to the minimality
of those assumptions, any extra structure to be added to a process theory will also have an
explicit mathematical meaning.
Third, one would like to recover and describe important properties of consciousness
from those basic and explicit axioms. Specifically, we would like to recover the unity of
consciousness. In process theory, compositionality outlines any unity as a non-trivially
composition of some basic processes [10,11]. Unity is formed by sequential and parallel
compositions of primary processes. Due to this foundational aspect, compositionality
may be a convenient way to target the unity of consciousness, by modelling the unity of
experience inside a process theory (Section 5).
3.2. Consciousness as Fundamental
Natural science has achieved great success in modern age, behind which there lies a ba-
sic assumption that everything is made of physical objects whose existence is independent
of any consciousness. This assumption is so powerful that renders scientific theories not too
complicated and allows science results to be tested by independent experiments. However,
such objective existence can never be verified by conscious agents, since most cognitive
activity is done through consciousness [28], thus the assumption is totally suspended.
Objectivity relates to a perceived or unperceived object, while subjectivity to a per-
ceiving subject. In a everyday understanding of the terms, the object is meant to exist
independently of any subject to perceive it (ontology), and as such, objectivity is com-
monly associated with concepts like truth and reliability (epistemic) [29,30], e.g., the visible
wavelength of light range from 700 nm to 400 nm. Contrary, subjectivity seems always
interdependent, it involves both perceived and perceiving aspects, making subjective
properties dependent of others interactions (internal or external to the subject) and thereof
co-dependent [12]. We can further distinguish between epistemic subjectivity, i.e., claims
not verifiable (e.g., the claim that red is more beautiful than green), and ontological subjec-
tivity [30]: subjective modes of existence, such as pain or “redness” experienced only by
the subject.
In order to understand our point of departure, we first need to recognize that ob-
jectivity is an assumption of basic science. The assumption of objectivity as primitive or
fundamental is deeply grounded in neuroscience, as well as other scientific fields [31–33].
Taking that assumption, one would expect that the subjective aspects of the experience
may naturally emerge from the interaction and combination of physical objective entities.
For example, contemporary theories of consciousness tend to focus on the physical atomic
parts from which, for instance, the unity of experience would emerge as a whole. The parts
are considered cells, neurons, brain regions, and the whole being the unified conscious
experience. This is called building blocks models [2] or reductionist approaches [32]. This
approach, however, leads to the hard problem of consciousness [2,34,35]: since each neuron
is composed of basic physical objects–atoms, and they are radically different from con-
sciousness in that they lack key features of the latter like self-awareness and unity [2,3], no
matter how complicated the interaction of these physical parts could be, how can those key
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features of consciousness arise from them? At this point, we consider the reader is familiar
enough with this problem, so that we can avoid any deeper introduction.
An alternative assumption is to treat conscious experience as primary, or fundamental
process of nature. We assume that all primary objects are indeed conscious-dependent.
Treating conscious experience as primary convey two possible interpretations: (i) ontologi-
cal, i.e., the nature/existence of consciousness is fundamental (substance), (ii) epistemic,
i.e., the nature of knowledge about the world is limited by our experience. In this line
of thoughts “our knowledge is limited to the realm of our own subjective impressions,
allowing us no knowledge of objective reality in and of itself” [9,29]. In this paper, we
are neutral about what is the optimal interpretation. Independently, we emphasize that
conscious experience is a primary process of nature, a transformation. Being fundamental
would also means that there is not further explanation. Therefore, physical objects would
be the result of consciousness transforming and everything considered, affirmed or denied,
even the idea of objectivity, would occur to us only in consciousness.
Although the new assumption dissolves or evades the hard problem of consciousness,
it comes with what we call the dual problem of consciousness: the question about how the
objective realm arise from subjective one. To deal with that problem and model conscious
experience from the assumption of the primacy of consciousness, we take inspiration from
the Eastern philosophy known as Yogacara.
3.3. Yogacara Philosophy
The reason why we choose the Yogacara philosophy and its phenomenology is mainly
because it has an explicit description of a structure of eight types of consciousnesses and
the relation between consciousness and the physical world. Moreover, the key feature
of the Yogacara philosophy is consciousness-only which means there is nothing outside
of all sentient beings’ consciousnesses. In modern words, consciousness-only would be
better understood as a claim of awareness-only, or perception-only, much closer to modern
phenomenology [5,36,37].
The Yogacara philosophy has a rich system of eight consciousnesses consisting of:
the first seven consciousnesses—the five sense-consciousnesses (eye or visual, ear or
auditory, nose or olfactory, tongue or gustatory, body or tactile consciousnesses), mental
consciousness (the sixth consciousness), manas consciousness (the seventh or thought-
centre consciousness), and the eighth consciousness—alaya consciousness (storehouse
consciousness). These eight consciousnesses are not independent of each other: “... the
Alaya consciousness and the first seven consciousnesses generate each in a steady process
and are reciprocally cause and effect” [38]. A clarifying metaphor is to think about the
eighth consciousness as the ocean, while the other consciousness are different types of
waves in its surface. Neither of them are separated of the others and all consciousness are
essentially one.
In this framework, the act of perception of the eighth consciousness (Alaya conscious-
ness) is considered extremely subtle or difficult to perceive [39]. Alaya consciousness
is thought to be the seed consciousness, i.e., to contain on its own different potentialities
that would engender other complex types of experiences [5,39]. We will approach these
potentialities only in relation with other seeds, leaving the types on our process theory for
Alaya consciousness unspecified (a future approach may define the internal structure of
Alaya taking six features in formal analogy with the seed metaphor from [39]). This might
be an economical strategy, since, although this structure is considered the same for all
living beings, the input and outputs types for those processes might be species dependent,
or even specific to each individual.
Moreover, each consciousness “manifests itself in two functional divisions (bhgas),
namely, image and perception, i.e., the object perceived or perceived division and the per-
ceiving faculty or perceiving division (nimittabhaga and darsanabhaga)” [39]. The perceived
is related to the object and the perceiving to the subject. In Husserlian phenomenology, this
division is extrapolated to what is called Noema versus Noesis distinction [40]. The first
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division is mostly related to the sixth consciousness and the five perceptual consciousnesses,
while the second one with the seventh manas consciousness.
The phenomenon of the physical world and the body which we feel everyday comes
from the perceived division of Alaya consciousness: “it transforms internally into seeds
and the body provided with organs, and externally into the world receptacle. These things
that are its transformations become its own object of perception (dlanzbana)” [38]. The
receptacle-world and the Body as part of the perceived division of Alaya consciousness
should not be thought of as the physical world and the physical body that we feel in
our normal lives, but as being related in that the appearance of the latter is based on the
existence of the former. As a consequence, the objectivity of the world comes from the
same structure shared by different sentient beings in the perceived division of their Alaya
consciousnesses.
In the rest of this work, we will focus on a simple model for the perceived and perceiv-
ing division of Alaya consciousness. In order to have a model of this structure, we highlight
three key ideas: (i) Alaya consciousness is very subtle and it is only shown before us as
co-dependent or interdependent process, (ii) Alaya consciousness is primary/fundamental,
from which other consciousness and the physical world may arise, (iii) Specifically, the
physical world arise from the perceived division of Alaya consciousness.
4. Compositional Model for Consciousness-Only
After the discussion in Section 3, we now provide a compositional model of consciousness
based on the Yogacara philosophy of consciousness-only and a few further assumptions.
4.1. Process Theory for Alaya Consciousness
The first feature of Alaya consciousness is its co-dependence, which means each
process of Alaya consciousness is dependent on other processes. The general process
theory can not display the other-dependence feature because most of its processes are not
specified (see Section 2.3). So we need a fine-grained version of process theory which has
generators specified by explicit rewriting rules. We might also choose these generators for
non-classical systems. This choice is partially justified by recent models of psychology and
cognition that seems to be quantum related [41,42]. Moreover, we also require that any
parameter appeared in the theory is not a concrete number, according to the unspecification
of the types we discussed above.
Based on the requirements for a fine-grained process theory that are noted in previous
sections, we introduce a formalism called qufinite ZX∆-calculus, which is a generalisation
of the normal ZX-calculus [18] regarding the following aspects: (1) a labelled triangle
symbol is introduced as a new generator, that’s why there is a ∆ in the name of the
generalised ZX-calculus, (2) all the qudit ZX-calculus (ZX-calculus for qudits– quantum
versions of d-ary digits) are unified in a single framework, (3) the parameters (phases) of
normal ZX-calculus are generalised from complex numbers to elements of an arbitrary
commutative semiring.
We give the details below of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus: generators and rewriting rules.
Throughout this section, N = {0, 1, 2, · · · } is the set of natural numbers, 2 ≤ d ∈ N, ⊕ is
the modulo d addition, S is an arbitrary commutative semiring [43]. All the diagrams are
read from top to bottom as in previous sections.
4.1.1. Generators of Qufinite ZX∆-Calculus
We give the generators of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus in Table 1.
Entropy 2021, 23, 308 9 of 18
Table 1. Generators of qufinite ZX∆-calculus, where m, n ∈ N;−→αd = (a1, · · · , ad−1); ai ∈ S ; i ∈




















Remark 1. Each input or output of a generator is labeled by a positive integer. For simplicity, the
first four generators have each of their inputs and outputs labelled by d, and we just give one label
to a wire.

































(1, · · · , 1); j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}; k ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1};−−→ed−k =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d−k
, · · · , 0);
ε represents an empty diagram.
In terms of consciousness interpretation, each generator may be thought as a basic
or primary conscious experience. Then, the set of generators becomes a minimal set of
experiences. This selection is not unique, unless the group of generators is sound and
complete, as we mentioned in Section 2.3.
For example, we may consider that basic conscious experiences involve many inputs












The experience of adding types might be described by d and perhaps primary perception
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realized by the process dj . The experience of inverting types might correspond to caps
and cups, combinations and segregation experiences may be represented by each of the
rhomboids, respectively.
The concrete specification of these or other generators is an empirical task that we left
for future works with trained phenomenologists. In our framework, some experiences that
are considered basic, such as seeing red or hearing a monotone sound may indeed be the
result of composition from our chosen set of generators or another set. This is due to the
particular choice we have made. Moreover, one can also choose those monotone experiences
(as far as one can give them explicit mathematical meaning) as part of another particular
set of generators. The question of what is the unique set of phenomenal generatores is
empirical and theoretical issue that may require attentive phenomenology and micro-
phenomenological tools. In that case, the goal is to target the soundness and completeness
of rewriting systems for conscious experience. Something far beyond the scope of our
preliminary attempt.
4.1.2. Rules of Qufinite ZX∆-Calculus
We provide rewriting rules for qufinite ZX∆-calculus in Figures 1 and 2. Even though
we do not specify which generator corresponds to each basic phenomenal experience, these
rules specify the generators in light of what they do regarding each other. Concretely, here
we focus on the idea that two or more generators define each other. For example, the green
dot d is specified by the rule d= d
d
d in the way that it is the only green spider
which has no input and one output and can be copied by the red spider d . Moreover,
the red spider d is also specified by the effects in the green dot
d . It means that the
experience of A, only makes sense if there is another experience B, from which one has a
relationship with the other. For instance, the experience of the colour red only make sense
if there is another experience of colour, for example, green and blue, otherwise there is not
such colour experience at all, or at least, it is of very different nature (e.g., colour blindness).
This is understood as a kind of contextual character of conscious phenomena, a particular
aspect of experience.
These rewriting rules become the axioms regarding a group of primary experiences,
and further ways to define the generators in relation with their consciousness interpretation.
In the example above, the red spider with many legs may convey the experience of copy
the experience from the green one. Again, specific phenomenal interpretations are left
for future works, while we focus here on the introduction of the main concepts and the
mathematical machinery.
Entropy 2021, 23, 308 11 of 18
Figure 1. Qufinite ZX∆-calculus rules I, where
−→αd = (a1, · · · , ad−1);
−→
βd = (b1, · · · , bd−1);
−−→
αdβd =
(a1b1, · · · , ad−1bd−1); ak, bk ∈ S ; k ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1}; m ∈ N.
Additionally, in order to form a compact closed category of diagrams, we also need




s s s s
= = s
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s1 s2 sk s1 s2 sk s1 s2 sk



















is an arbitrary diagram in the qufinite ZX∆-calculus.
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(1, · · · , 1);−→0 d =
d−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 0);−→αd =
(a1, · · · , ad−1);
−→
βd = (b1, · · · , bd−1); ak, bk ∈ S ; k ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; j ∈ {1, · · · , d− 1}; s, t, u ∈ N\{0}.
The first two diagrams in Equation (1) mean the cap ηs and the cup εs are symmetric,
while the last diagram means the connected cap and cup can be yanked. The first two
diagrams of Equation (2) mean any diagram could move across a line freely, representing
the naturality of the swap morphism. The last diagram of Equation (2) means the swap
morphism is self-inverse. Note that now we have a self-dual compact structure rather than
a general compact structure, which makes representation of diagrams much easier.
From the rewriting rules noted above, we form a strict self-dual compact closed
category Z of ZX diagrams. The objects of Z are all the positive integers, and the monoidal
product on these objects are multiplication of integer numbers. Denote the set of generators
listed in Table 1 as G. Let Z [G] be a free monoidal category generated by G in the following
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way—(i) any two diagrams D1 and D2 are placed side-by-side with D1 on the left of D2
to form the monoidal product on morphisms D1 ⊗ D2, or (ii) the outputs of D1 connect
with the inputs of D2 when their types all match to each other to form the sequential
composition of morphisms D2 ◦ D1. The empty diagram is a unit of parallel composition
and the diagram of a straight line is a unit of the sequential composition. Denote the
set of rules listed in Figures 1 and 2, Equations (1) and (2) by R. One can check that
rewriting one diagram to another diagram according to the rules of R is an equivalence
relation on diagrams in Z [G]. We also call this equivalence as R, then the quotient category
Z = Z [G]/R is a strict self-dual compact closed category. The qufinite ZX∆-calculus is
seen as a graphical calculus based on the category Z.
4.2. Standard Interpretation of Qufinite ZX∆-Calculus
To ensure that qufinite ZX∆-calculus is sound, we need to test its rules in a preexisting
reliable system which we now describe. These interpretations, however, does not represent
the explicit meaning in terms of our consciousness processes. They are given here to test
soundness.
Let MatS be the category whose objects are non-zero natural numbers and whose
morphisms M : m→ n are n×m matrices taking values in a given commutative semiring S .
The composition is matrix multiplication, the monoidal product on objects and morphisms
are multiplication of natural numbers and the Kronecker product of matrices respectively.
Then MatS is a strict self-dual compact closed category. We give a standard interpretation,
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JD1 ⊗ D2K = JD1K⊗ JD2K; JD1 ◦ D2K = JD1K ◦ JD2K;
where s, t ∈ N\{0}; 〈i| =
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i+1
, · · · , 0); |i〉 = (
d︷ ︸︸ ︷
(0, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i+1
, · · · , 0))T ; i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d− 1};
and [r] is the integer part of a real number r.
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One can verify that the qufinite ZX∆-calculus is sound in the sense that for any two
diagrams D1, D2 ∈ Z, D1 = D2 must imply that JD1K = JD2K. This standard interpretation
J·K is actually a strict symmetric monoidal functor from Z to MatS .
According the standard interpretation, if S is the field of complex numbers, then the
green spider corresponds to the computational basis |i〉}d−1i=0 , with d− 1 phase angles. The
red spider corresponds to the Fourier basis coming from Fourier transformation of the
computational basis, up to a global scalar. The red dj diagram represents the j-th unitary
which is also a permutation matrix, with j ranging from 0 to d. The triangle diagram
labelled with d acts as a successor of phase parameters (adding 1’s to them). The two
trapezium diagrams represent unitaries between the Hilbert space of Hs ⊗Ht and the
Hilbert space Hst, these two diagrams are invertible to each other.
4.3. The Perceived Division of Alaya Consciousness
Now, we model the perceived division of Alaya consciousness. As we have intro-
duced in Section 3.3, the content of the perceived version of Alaya consciousness is the
phenomenon of the physical world and the body which is supposed to have the same
mathematical structure for all sentient beings in this world (not necessarily the same types,
which may bring specificity and a treatment for individuality). Since each physical object is
supposed to be composed of quantum systems, the perceived version of Alaya conscious-
ness is modelled here by the category FdHilb: the category whose objects are all finite
dimensional complex Hilbert spaces and whose morphisms are linear maps between the
Hilbert spaces with ordinary composition of linear maps as compositions of morphisms.
The usual Kronecker tensor product is the monoidal tensor, and the field of complex num-
bers C (which is a one-dimensional Hilbert space over itself) is the tensor unit. FdHilb is
the category of quantum processes which composes the physical world. Since the body is a
part of the physical world, the body part of the perceived division of alaya consciousness
may be modelled by a subcategory of FdHilb.
4.4. The Perceiving Division of Alaya Consciousness
The function of the perceiving division of Alaya consciousness is to perceive the
perceived division, which means a perceiving action from the subject (perceiving) to the
object (perceived) of the Alaya consciousness. Since a functor is a structure preserving
map or transformation from one category to another one, our first attempt is to model the
perceiving division of Alaya consciousness by a functor from Z to FdHilb. This functor
is set up as a modification of the standard interpretation functor J·K, i.e.,: just choose a
semiring homomorphism f from S to C and let {|i〉}d−1i=0 a standard basis of a Hilbert space
with dimension d, then replace ai with f (ai) in the codomain of the interpretation J·K. One
can check that a monoidal functor is obtained in this way, where a semiring homomorphism
from S to C is selected.
5. The Unity of Experience
As a consequence of our first simple approach to model conscious experience, we
consider the combination problem of the unity of experience.
We suggest that some aspects of Alaya consciousness can be modelled by qufinite
ZX∆-calculus, making it a serious and somewhat justified attempt. A general diagram rep-
resents some primary conscious experience and a diagram with outputs but without inputs
represent a state of consciousness. Sequential composition of two diagrams represents two
successive conscious processes happening one after the another, while parallel composition
of two diagrams represents two conscious processes happening simultaneously. These
processes may compound to generate more complex experiences.
Our approach is an alternative to conserve the irreducible and fundamental nature of
experience. It is not, however, the only one. Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, among
others philosophies, also consider experience seriously, but these two assigns a quantifiable
character to that experience. According to these views, consciousness is present in all
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fundamental physical entities [44] and the composition of basic blocks of experience creates
our conscious experience.
Nevertheless, an important question remains for those irreductible attemps: How “mi-
crophenomenal seeds of consciousness” constitute macrophenomenal conscious experiences
as we experience them? —the so-called combination problem for Panpsychism and Panpro-
topsychism [45]. This problem convey an specific form of the hard problem of consciousness,
i.e., how could the key features of consciousness, like its unity, arise from any kind of interac-
tions of physical atomic experiences (given by physical theory of your choice), no matter how
many of these atoms and how complicated the interactions are, which have none of those
key features? [2,34,35]. In other words, how these building blocks of experience compound
one single unified macro phenomenal subjective experience [3]: the phenomenal unity of
experience [3,46]. In Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism, the dualism between mind and
matter is now replaced by two modes, micro and macro experience, of the same ontology.
Remarkable, the combination problem has three aspects [45]: structural, subject and
quality. Each one of these aspects leads to a specific sub-problem. On the one hand,
the structure of the micro world, mostly associated with quantum mechanics, gives the
impression of being different from the structure of macro experiences. This is the structural
mismatch problem, which also appears between macro experience structure and macro
physical structures in the brain [45]. On the other hand, there is the question of how micro
subject combine to give rise to macro subjects, and how micro qualities combine to give
macro qualities. It seems that no group of micro subjects need the existence of a macro
subject, and additionally, it is not clear how possible limited micro qualities yield to the
many macro qualities that can be experienced, including different colors, shapes, sounds,
smells, and tastes (for detail see [45]). According to Chalmers, a satisfactory solution of the
combination problem must face all these three aspects.
Our framework targets all of these aspects of the combination problem. First, the
mathematical structure of the qufinite ZX∆-calculus for Alaya consciousness is a unification
of all dimensional qudit ZX-calculus. If generators are interpreted in Hilbert space, the latest
becomes a graphical language for quantum theory. This means that the ZX∆-calculus for
conscious processes shares a similar structure to quantum theory (please note that a similar
structure means similar mathematical relationships, i.e., two very different phenomena in
nature may share the same structure and being modelled by the same equations, or more
generally, the same categories). This similarity solves the mismatch at the level of micro
experience, without any ontological commitment to quantum particles (e.g., different to
Hameroff and Penrose model [47]). At the level of macro experiences we avoid any match
or mismatch with macro physical structures because the model does not reduce experience
to neural events (non-isomorphic relationship). It means that conscious experience does
not need to share the same structure that classical neurons. Second, the model does not
distinguish between subject and quality, everything is a conscious process, a conscious
experience. Those fundamental conscious processes of reality, namely the generators of the
theory, compound other conscious processes just by means of connecting them together:
via sequential and parallel composition. The result of those compositions are other more
complex subjective and qualitative processes. New compounded processes depend on the
basic generators, while the generators are interrelated to define themselves via rewriting
rules (axioms), representing more complex experiential relationships; i.e., each process
need other processes to specify itself.
In our framework, unity of consciousness is naturally described as a result of process
composition [48]. If someone insists on generators being matched with subjects or agents,
then micro subjects (generators) and macro subjects (composition of generators) necessitate
themselves as imposed by the co-dependent nature. This deals with the problem of
subject/quality composition at the level of Alaya consciousness (please check [45] for
details on that problem). This treatment also allows to deal with the combination of specific
qualities as the result of compositions in the seventh mental consciousness, work that form
part of an ongoing project.
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Summarizing, while in Panpsychism the division between micro and macro is given
by physical systems (e.g., atoms versus neurons, or neurons versus neural assembles),
in our framework there is no such distinction. The distinction just vanish, since we
consider generators that already carry the properties of the whole (experience), following
the compositionality principle. The choice of generators might seems arbitrary, and it is, as
far as we do not have a sound and complete rewriting system for conscious experience.
6. Conclusions
Our framework is based on arbitrary commutative semirings as a compositional model
of consciousness, with the emphasis on its potential use for the mathematical and structural
studies of consciousness [13–15]. We introduced generators and processes as abstract mathe-
matical structures to target some aspects of the conscious experience which are independent of
their physical realizations. This introduction is inspired by the Yogacara school of Buddhism
and other philosophies assuming that consciousness is primary or fundamental. In this
first attempt, we have focused on Alaya consciousness, its co-dependent character and its
perceived and perceiving division. It allow us to make a first approach to the dual question of
how the objective world emerges from the subjective one.
A future approach may target more details on the internal structure of Alaya conscious-
ness, taking for example, six features in formal analogy with the seed metaphor from [39]. More-
over, we leave for future work the model of mental, manas and the five sense-consciousnesses.
In the future, we also expect to generalise the qufinite ZX∆-calculus to the infinite dimensional
case, from which standard quantum mechanics might be recovered. It is to be noted that we
have not recovered standard quantum mechanics. To do so would mean generalising our
model to derive the standard quantum mechanics described by the Schrödinger equation.
This is important in order to give a definitive answer to the dual problem of consciousness
introduced above.
Other very interesting models also aim to target that question. For example, the
conscious agent model intends to recover fundamental physics from the agent’s interactions,
as for instance in quantum mechanics [49]. Sadly, it is not clear that current versions
of the conscious agent model are capable of recovering the entire objective realm (see
objections and replies section in [49]). In our framework part of the reconstruction goal
pursued by the conscious agent model is achieved for free, without overhead, invoking
only the simple structure of SMC in relationship with phenomenal aspects. In doing so,
our approach to consciousness processes and quantum theory share a similar, but not the
same, mathematical structure.
It allows a compositional treatment of the combination problem of basic experience
that may give rise to complex ones. One very influential model of consciousness also
attempting to target that question is the the integrated information theory (IIT) [50]. This
model, however, conveys a Panpsychist view. Unfortunately, the model is not neutral
about the physical neural substrate, and although it intends to highlight the primacy of
consciousness, in practice, the current version falls in reductive accounts. Such models
also claim compositions, but they are not compositional in the sense exposed here. In IIT,
the minimal elements of the theory are gates that are not conscious, while consciousness
emerges from the right causal combination of these gates (integration). Contrary, compo-
sitionality in our sense means that the minimal compositional elements, i.e., generatores,
represents already conscious experiences.
Our model, the conscious agent model and IIT, all share the same goal of mathematize
phenomenology. Although with different philosophical commitments, the common point
of departure is that axioms and postulates consider aspects of consciousness as primary.
However, we close by remarking that a process theory for consciousness is not only
about modelling consciousness with any type of mathematics (as other models), but
about modelling consciousness with category theory in a graphical form, i.e., axiomatic
mathematics. This form of mathematics explicitly introduces structures, assumptions
and axioms, plus the possibility of compositional treatments. We believe that because
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being foundational, this approach is better suited to describing the conscious experience as
fundamental. Finally, we are hopeful that due to its co-dependent feature, and sufficient
generality, our framework may pave the way for further research on the scientific study of
conscious experience and its phenomenology.
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